

INTELLIGENCE STUDIES: A DRIVE FOR A NEW SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE IN POLAND

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the elements of intelligence practice that have the potential to improve resilience and prevent intelligence failures. The most important drivers were identified using structured and unstructured interviews with intelligence practitioners and scholars. They were complemented by ideas and references to intelligence works published in recent years to find references to problems the Polish intelligence community is facing now. The primary efforts focused on developing intelligence studies as an academic discipline based on formal education and training and a formal selection process. The objective is to convince intelligence practitioners to build relationships to help understand security problems and increase public awareness of national security issues and intelligence activities.

Keywords: geopolitics, hybrid warfare, intelligence studies, situational awareness

INTRODUCTION

We must tackle immediate problems in our increasingly complex and dangerous operational environment and prepare for tomorrow's threats. We must equip the Polish intelligence community to deal with conventional threats and counter radicalization and violent extremism. These efforts include processes and procedures that detect, deter, and mitigate influence and information operations. We must advocate more effective measures to counter the most critical dimensions of hybrid warfare. Such things are essential to improve national and allied national resilience and avoid failure to act early enough to protect the nation.

METHODOLOGY

This paper employed structured and unstructured interviews with over a dozen intelligence practitioners and scholars who have conducted intelligence operations, developed intelligence policy and practice, and advised and mentored policymakers and practitioners in Poland. For security and professional reasons, the study's participants are not named. The interviews and framework were based on numerous academics and practitioners' arguments, essays, and findings. We especially acknowledge Gregory F. Treverton, Wilhelm Agrell, Christopher Andrew, James B. Bruce, Roger Z. George, Patrick F. Walsh, Alan Breakspear, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, David Kahn, Andrew Rathmell, and Michael Warner.

This paper's findings were organized into four topic categories: developing intelligence studies as an academic discipline; identifying the main areas of intelligence studies; determining practicalities related to teaching intelligence in academia; and structuring linkages between scholars, customers, and intelligence organizations. The overarching goal was to identify ideas warranting future research and discussions.

CURRENT STATUS

Early efforts to formalize training and education at the Polish Academia were minimal and difficult to aggregate. This research aims to build upon those efforts and routinize the development of intelligence studies. It seeks to develop intelligence studies as a social science by extending research to practice (i.e., building its conceptual and theoretical foundations and transferring outcomes to the world of practitioners). Focused efforts should be on analysis. This specific area of research is the most urgent operational requirement. Intelligence studies need an overarching or grand theory that underpins the factors that drive analysis. Specifically, offering a national theory of intelligence that identifies critical requirements, guidelines for collection, analysis, and dissemination, techniques, tools, and ethical guidelines.

BUILDING THE FRAMEWORK

We must identify and structure the relationship between policymakers and intelligence practitioners. Each must understand the role of the other and the tenets of intelligence. This would mean designing several governmental and academic projects devoted to the study of intelligence. We want intelligence studies to explore new elements and new dimensions. The projects have the potential to include innovative approaches to intelligence and incite debates on its fundamental problems.

Another element to constructing the national theory of intelligence could be building links between foreign policy, assessing threats to national security, and establishing objectives for intelligence. Of course, such a theory should envisage the existence of some limitations and inadequacies, such as the presence of timing coordination in intelligence processes and procedures, irrelevant and redundant elements, the reluctance of decision-makers to accept some essential and valuable pieces of information and politicization of information. Special attention should also be placed on biases and assumptions, which are considered the primary source of inefficiency of intelligence practice.

Current reflections lead to one important conclusion: We should stop considering intelligence as an art or tradecraft and start contemplating intelligence as several complicated organizational and institutional processes concentrated on building knowledge useful for optimal decision-making. I expect the evolution of intelligence studies will permanently change research priorities and expand research areas. In the new century, many new theories, methods, techniques, and tools were introduced to intelligence studies and achievements from other scientific fields and disciplines, including humanities, natural sciences, engineering, and information and communication technology.

MAIN AREAS FOR FUTURE AREAS OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

This study identified ten principal areas for intelligence studies:

1. The history of intelligence and development of international cooperation;
2. Development of intelligence as an academic discipline, including sub-disciplines;
3. Comparative national intelligence with a focus on the European Union;

4. International intelligence cooperation and creation of supranational intelligence communities;
5. Public-private intelligence collaboration;
6. Analysis of intelligence institutions' effectiveness, including assessment of the intelligence cycle, intelligence biases, and analytical toolkits;
7. Supervision and control of intelligence by state institutions and civil society;
8. In-depth reflection on these complex systems' intelligence structures, functions, and logic;
9. Creation and reinforcement of situational awareness with elements constructed with multidisciplinary cognitive formulas and new tools using cognitive and synthetic (artificial) intelligence;
10. Geopolitics with a focus on political, sociological research, and cultural studies.

For the practicalities related to teaching intelligence in academia, one of the objectives should be teaching how the government is structured, what it does, and how the intelligence function acts as a part of the machinery of the state. We also want to teach intelligence in the context of security threats, including regional actors, instability, conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and various non-state actors—including but not limited to terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and piracy. We also want students to master critical thinking skills (i.e., reasoning, analysis, inferential thinking), communication skills, thoroughness, determination, and adaptability. Most of the analysts' initial training is focused on preparing intelligence products and maintaining databases rather than on the analytical toolkit.

THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

The future of intelligence studies requires a foundational base that captures an ever-evolving threat landscape. First, the base should include a revised introductory module that contextualizes the implications of geopolitics and the role of great powers, transnational criminal and terrorist organizations, cyberspace, and emerging technologies. Second, the focus should be on analysis, including structured analytical techniques, scenario and futures analysis, and net assessment. Finally, the base should include the role of interpersonal and interagency communication, cooperation, and collaboration. This will prepare analysts to excel in conducting seven main intelligence tasks. Training for specific and critical tasks should occur not at universities but in classified environments at the in-house institutions of intelligence services. The emergence of such programs, structured as described above, with targeted intelligence curricula in the undergraduate and graduate fields should contribute to the change. In Poland, transformation is already underway in the field of postgraduate education.

CONCLUSION

All efforts mentioned above should increase intelligence analysis professionalism—with the adoption of professional practices, formalized selection processes, training, education and development programs, norms, and performance standards, as well as the establishment of a civilian/military occupational specialty. These practices will increase the competence of

individual analysts and the reliability of the products they generate. This may lead to decision-makers greater acceptance of intelligence.

In addition, creating a centralized academic focal point for the knowledge and best practices should enable intelligence analysis to mature and help introduce necessary norms and standards within the national intelligence community. As a result, it should lead to greater consistency and reliability in intelligence production and improvements in both individual and organizational performance. This will turn intelligence analysis from a craft-based to a more formal professional practice and change the culture of intelligence analysts. It should also help establish the mechanism for improving the performance of analysis.

The War Studies University wants to convince intelligence services in Poland to build relationships that would help better understand current and emerging security problems and build public awareness of national security issues and intelligence activities. Intelligence institutions should also be active in providing academia with the necessary advice and continue an informed dialogue on national security. This would ensure that academia is aware of the threat environment and has all the information needed to launch informed discussions and propose new security measures. Such communication should be reinforced by facilitating collaboration and information sharing between intelligence and external elements to create an environment of continuous learning complemented by innovation.

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